Was the use of atomic bomb on japan justified Essay

Was the use of atomic bomb on japan justified - Essay Example But was Truman’s decision justified or was ill informed? A controversial event in history that has divided scholars right in the middle, the use of the Atomic Bomb was but a justified decision that spared the United States an estimated 250,000, perhaps more, sure fatalities in there planned invasion of Japan in addition to millions of Japanese [soldiers and civilians alike] destined for a bloody fight-to-the-death battle in defense of a beloved fatherland. The True Story While the weight of the fateful decision fell right on the shoulders of Truman, the origins of the weapon began with the Roosevelt administration’s fear of a parallel development of the same by Germany. Leo Szilard’s confidential letter to the then President Franklin Roosevelt, signed off by his longtime friend and collaborator Albert Einstein, outlining Germany’s concerted efforts on nuclear weapons formed the foundation of the Manhattan Project [S-1], â€Å"one of the largest, best-kept secret, massive resource consuming, scientific undertakings ever witnessed in history† (Walker 311-312). Indeed, even Truman, the then vice president had no knowledge of the project and only learnt of it in office. Though actively engaged in atomic research, German scientists, as it would later turn out right after Germany’s surrender, were far from reaching a fissionable chemical combination that could deliver results rivaling the United States’. Japan’s similar initiatives were thrown into disarray in April 1945 with a B-29 raid on Tokyo facilities leaving anything of the sort inundated. (Frank 252-253). The fall of the previously Japanese controlled Marianas Islands early in the campaign gave the United States formidable footholds of bringing the war closer home to the remaining Japanese strongly-held islands. With surrender heavily disdained, reinforcement directives from Imperial General Headquarters [IGHQ] detailed in the â€Å"Plan for the Conduct of Future Operations† went out on the 24th July, 1944 with four points: 1. Patriotic defense of the Philippines, Ryukyu, Kurile, Formosa, Japan Islands and the entire Japanese homeland from the shoreline right into the interior. 2. Massive annihilation of the Allies by sea, land and by the remaining air power for any attempted advance through the United States’ planned amphibious assault to the crucial areas [the â€Å"Sho-Go† Operations]. 3. The last two points called for the prevention of American B-29 aircraft attacks operating from China to ensure better cover [overrunning China bomber bases to open up continental railroads as an alternative route to their Southern Resources Area]. 4. Identifying alternative southern sea routes [particularly to the China Coast] to safeguard important military shipments (Bradlley 189). With the new SHO operations that basically enlarged mobile defense writ, Japan hoped to gain decisive victory no matter the beachhead attacked by the enemy. SHO-1 and SHO-2, the battles of Philippines and Formosa-Ryukyu were planned for august; followed by SHO-3 and SHO-4 in the home islands and Hokkaido scheduled for October 1944. Having identified possible planned landing bases by the invasion forces, the supposedly defeated Japanese strategically stationed themselves to meet the visitors head-on at an equal strength. As a tactical approach, they [Japanese] planned to abandoned direct combat with the powerfully